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Abstract—Patient Health Records (PHRs) shift the ownership
of health data from health providers to patients. Such a shift poses
important challenges from the data privacy point of view. Patients
would like to be able to selectively reveal information to other
stakeholders and, at the same time, be assured that their health
information will not be used improperly once shared. Current
PHR systems partially fail to satisfy these requirements. In this
paper, we show that both requirements can be satisfied fully when
adopting a novel cloud-based PHR system architecture. We expain
the role of remote virtual machines in this architecture and use
interaction models to reason about privacy implications. Finally,
we evaluate MyPHRMachines, a prototypical implementation of
the architecture: we demonstrate that the system enables the
execution of third party genome analysis services on patient-
owned genome data while ensuring that (1) such services cannot
maliciously store this data and (2) patients can show the analysis
results to experts without sharing along their full genome.
Index Terms—Patient Health Record, Privacy, Security, Cloud
Computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Patient Health Records (PHRs) are a set of computer tools
that allow people to access and coordinate their lifelong health
information and make appropriate parts of it available to those
who need it [9]. PHR systems differ from traditional Electronic
Health Record (EHR) systems, being centered around the
patient rather than delivered by individual caregivers.
PHR systems shift the ownership of health information from
caregivers to patients, giving support to health information
collection, sharing, change, and self-management [8], [18].
PHR systems are likely to decrease the cost of patient infor-
mation management and, at the same time, increase quality
of care, allowing patients to reproduce their complete and
accurate medical history in a computerized repository when
requested or needed [1], [13]. PHR systems can also empower
patients to seek care from alternative caregivers and to engage
into emerging social platforms bringing together patients with
similar conditions [5]. Finally, PHR systems can empower
intelligent assistance services since PHRs are more integrated
and longitudinal than conventional patient records.
One of the main barriers to the adoption of PHR systems
is posed by privacy and security issues. Patients and, more
generally, citizens, show great concern about the privacy and
security of their health records [10]. This concern becomes
particularly important when patients provide their personal
data to public or private institutions providing data analysis or
diagnosis services. In this scenario, patients have very few or
literally no actual guarantees on how providers of such services
will use their personal data. Although personal health data
should be strictly used only to satisfy the patients’ requests,
there are multiple example cases in which such information
has been used for different scopes and used for commercial
purpose [2].
More generally, PHR systems privacy and security are char-
acterized by a paradox. On the one hand, in fact, digitization
of information should decrease the risk that information can be
lost or improperly modified. On the other hand, however, the
security provided by paper-based records, which are available
only at a small number of physical locations, greatly reduces
the risk of multi-site unauthorized access entailed by health
records available on the Internet [16]. Furthermore, digitized
patient health information can be easily duplicated and im-
properly used by the same institutions with which the patients
share information.
This paper focuses on privacy problems related to using
PHR systems to support information sharing among patients
and caregivers. In particular, we first classify the conceptual
and technical issues about PHR privacy of those systems that
are currently available on the market. Then, we introduce an
innovative PHR system whose design alleviates many of these
issues. We focus specifically on allowing patients to selectively
disclose information to caregivers, preventing them to misuse
the PHR data that the patients share. The PHR system we
consider is MyPHRMachines, developed by the authors, which
is presented more extensively in [19].
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
related work on PHR systems. The analysis of today’s security-
related vulnerabilities and our proposed solution are discussed
in Section III and IV, respectively. The solution is evaluated in
the concrete context of secure genomic data analyses. Conclu-
sions and future work are eventually presented in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
PHR systems can be classified into free standing and
provider-tethered. The latter are spin-offs of EHR systems in
use by specific institutions, while the former are developed
independently by a software vendor. Free standing PHR sys-
tems promote true patient ownership of health data and pose
the challenge of integration with the information systems of
several heterogenous health institutions and caregivers, e.g.
hospitals, GPs, private clinics, or insurers. Provider-tethered
PHRs, on the one hand, promote a stickier relationship between
the provider and the patient. On the other hand, however, they
do not address the continuity of care requirement envisioned
for PHRs [8]: an interoperability problem still arises when the
patient seeks care from a caregiver outside of the network of
the provider by which the PHR system is tethered.
According to [4] in free-standing PHR systems all data
have to be (re-)entered manually by patients. When adhering
to this strict interpretation, a third category of PHR systems
arises - that of so-called integrated PHR systems. Such systems
integrate EHR data from multiple providers automatically in
a comprehensive record. We observe that this can be realized
by keeping the data inside the backend provider systems or by
replicating it in a free-standing repository. From a security
and privacy perspective, the location and ownership of the
data is the main issue to be taken into account. Therefore, we
only differentiate between free standing and provider-tethered
approaches, assuming that (1) free-standing approaches can
always be integrated with provider systems to avoid manual
re-entry of data and (2) multiple providers can always provide
one PHR as thin extensions to their EHRs.
From the privacy point of view, free standing PHRs systems
(e.g., MyHealtheVet and HealthVault) pose a more prominent
threat than tethered approaches. Organizations providing free
standig PHR systems, in fact, will have access to a sizable
mount of personal health information of different patients,
which can have economic value for insurance and pharma-
ceutical companies. Moreover, such organizations may not
be subject to privacy and security regulations such as the
HIPAA, which normally apply only to healthcare providers,
e.g. hospitals and private clinics [3].
From the IT architecture point of view, PHR systems can be
classified into Web-based and offline PHRs. Web-based PHR
systems adopt an architecture storing health information in a
database and making it available to patients through a Web
application [15]. Offline PHRs use a physical support such
as smart cards or USB keys [14] to store health information.
Security and privacy of patient-owned health information in
a PHR system have been addressed mostly from a technical
perspective. As far as security is concerned, the literature
suggests traditional solutions developed for Web application
to strengthen the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
Web-based PHR systems [21]. Offline PHR systems, in this
context, show the same security-related features of paper-
based records. They reduce the risk of unauthorized access by
maintaining health information in one physical location and by
supporting enhanced authentication mechanisms. At the same
time, however, they can be stolen, misplaced, or simply lost.
III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY RELATED VULNERABILITIES
OF PHR SYSTEMS
In this section we discuss the requirements for health
information privacy that, according to our analysis, are not
satisfied by current PHR systems. In the next section, we will
demonstrate how such requirements could be satisfied, under
specific circumstances, by our MyPHRMachines system, in
the scenario of health information sharing for digital diagnosis
services.
Information privacy can be defined as the ability of an
individual or a group to seclude information selectively and
thereby reveal or made available such information selectively.
Privacy has become an important concern in the modern digital
world, since the amount of information about a certain object
that can be collected by either an individual or an institution
has dramatically increased with the advent of the Internet [17].
An information privacy issue occurs when information is
disclosed to or improperly accessed by a third-party without
the consent of the owner of the information.
For several reasons, in the healthcare domain, patients may
not want for their medical health records to be revealed to
others. Healthcare records may affect the patients’ insurance
coverages or employment; patients may consider inappropriate
or even embarrassing for others to know about their personal
psychological conditions or treatments; they may not want for
their medical records to be used by governmental agencies or
third-party companies for commercial purposes as a source of
profit; or, simply, they may not want others to know particular
details of their own lives. Patient health information privacy is
regulated by the law in most countries through the definition of
physician-patient privileges, e.g. the HIPAA act in the United
States.
PHR systems shift the ownership of patient health informa-
tion from health institutions to patients [8], [18]. In this paper,
we do not focus on the legal implications of such an ownership
shift, but we rather focus on how the shift of the ownership
of health information impacts the technical requirements of
modern PHR systems. Specifically, the above discussion about
introduces two requirements for PHR systems:
• R1 PHR systems should allow patients to selectively
reveal information to other stakeholders, such as GPs,
hospitals, insurers, or other interested parties;
• R2 PHR systems should guarantee that, once shared with
a stakeholder, health information of a patient cannot be
improperly used by the stakeholder.
The requirement R1 is not explicitly satisfied by current
Web-based PHR systems. These systems, in fact, only allow
patients to collect and store digitized health information, but
they usually do not include any design mechanism to selec-
tively delegate access. Only very few commercial systems im-
plement simple role-based access control mechanisms on PHR
data. PeopleChart 1, for instance, allows to separate private
and public health information and it gives the opportunity to
specify different roles, e.g. provider or caregiver, to access the
information labelled as public.
The requirement R2 cannot be satisfied alone by the design
of the PHR system, since it requires also the collaboration
of the stakeholder with whom information is shared. In this
paper, however, we will demonstrate that under specific cir-
cumstances, the design of the PHR system can force the
satisfaction of such a requirement.
1http://www.peoplechart.com
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Fig. 1. Remote Virtual Machines supporting PHR management in the cloud.
IV. A CLOUD-BASED PHR ARCHITECTURE
Subsection IV-A provides an introduction to the
MyPHRMachines architecture. Subsection IV-A provides
a more rigorous description of the key system interaction
scenarios relevant for assuring the privacy of PHR data.
A. The architecture of MyPHRMachines
Fig. 1 visualizes the architecture of MyPHRMachines. The
top-left end of the figure shows care organizations generating
health-related data, which may become relevant also for other
caregivers. In particular cases, the data is already offered by
portals. For example, various hospitals provide portal-based
EHR or PACS access to GPs in their region. The proposed
architecture applies particularly to those domains where the
data should transcend regional and temporal constraints: the
idea is to copy patient data from isolated care systems to
one or more central, trusted data repository. Data entry in the
repository can be done directly when the care institutions push
their data to the repository (cfr., the edge labeled as ➀ in
Fig. 1), or indirectly if they provide a copy to the patient, who
can then upload his/her data to the repository (cfr., the two
edges labeled as ➁ in Fig. 1). Note that the repository only
supports the uploading of raw data. More advanced repository
functionality is conceivable but not needed here.
We model the repository functionality as two operations of
the Data Repository entity in the conceptual model shown in
Fig. 2. One operation stores PHR data while the other retrieves
that. The fact that this data is raw is modeled by making it a
subclass of entity BLOB (Binary Large OBject). Note that both
operations should be parameterized with patient credentials but
we abstract of such details since they are quite trivial and
would clutter our diagrams.
Edge ➂ in Fig. 1 models a patient who interacts with
the MyPHRMachines portal. Via this portal, the patient can
select, start and stop remote Virtual Machines (VMs) to
which the PHR data will be mounted securely. By default,
MyPHRMachines blocks all traffic from a virtual machine to
the Internet; thus by default patients are assured that their
sensitive data cannot be transferred to other Internet locations
during the VM execution. Moreover, the remote procedure
calls for starting and stopping remote virtual machines (cfr.,
➃ in Fig. 1) are assumed to leverage state-of-the-art security
mechanisms to ensure that they cannot be executed maliciously
by other Internet users. Edge ➄ in Fig. 1 models that the
PHR data of a patient is mounted to his/her virtual machine.
The supportive infrastructure should ensure that data is only
mounted to VMs that have been started by the data owner.
Edge ➅ in Fig. 1 models remote patient access to his/her
virtual machine. Remote access should be ubiquitous: patients
can use a desktop web browser, a smartphone application, or
any other device with appropriate internet access and display
capabilities. Virtual machines can contain advanced decision
support software, specialized medical viewers, data transfor-
mation software, etc. The execution of application software is
not constrained by the caregiver device capabilities, since it
occurs remotely in virtual machines.
Edge ➆ in Fig. 1 models that patients can also show their
PHR to caregivers, e.g. their GP. In this case, caregivers receive
a unique URL that gives browser access to a running VM as
long as the patient keeps it running. In principle, the patient
can grant access to a specific VM where only selected PHR
data have been mounted. This guarantees that patients can
selectively reveal information to other stakeholders. Patients
can expect the caregiver to consider his/her PHR data since
no untrusted software needs to be executed on the caregiver’s
machine. The quality of care provided by caregivers increases,
since (1) they can take into account the full patient history,
and (2) they can get service-based access to decision support
tools that their organization has not invested in.
MyPHRMachines does not enable caregivers to download
data from a shared virtual machine. This ensures that once
patients shut down the virtual machine, caregivers no longer
have access to the PHR data. As soon as data would be
offered for download, this could no longer be ensured formally.
This control feature is a unique architectural strength from a
patient privacy point of view. Additionally, the remote virtual
machines can monitor the complete caregiver session. This
enables real-time or a posteriori checks against malicious usage
patterns. In this context, the proposed architecture respects
the caregiver privacy since only the interactions with software
within the remote virtual machines can be monitored.
B. System Interaction Models
The UML sequence diagram shown in Fig. 3 models the
system behavior when a patient starts a new virtual machine:
after retrieving PHR data from a trusted PHR data repository,
the system retrieves an image of the virtual machine. Virtual
machine images are stored in a so-called VM Image Library.
We model this library as a separate entity since it enables
scenarios with multiple distinct image libraries (e.g., one per
insurance company, country, etc.). Once MyPHRMachines has
retrieved both the patient data and the virtual machine image,
it can start a virtual machine with the right data and the
right software. The architecture preserves patient privacy since
maintenance of images in the library can be performed also
without mounting PHR data.
The UML sequence diagram shown in Fig. 4 models the
Fig. 2. Conceptual Model for PHRs in the Cloud.
Fig. 3. Starting a new virtual machine session in MyPHRMachines.
patient-oriented scenario of sharing a virtual machine session
with a caregiver. The diagram models that a patient passes
some virtual machine identifier to the caregiver. In the op-
erational MyPHRMachines prototype, this identifier consists
of a long, cryptic string identifier. The caregiver can use this
identifier to access the virtual machine even without having a
system account, i.e. he/she does not have to login. This enables
true 1-click access to the shared virtual machine session. The
downside of this solution is that without additional security
measures, malicious Internet users could intercept the access
delegation message to get access to the VM session. Since
caregivers tend to have secure messaging tools in place, we
do not consider this as a major threat.
The opt block in Figure 4 models optional behavior. It
represents the explicit shutdown of a session by a patient. The
cross on the dashed vm line denotes that such a shutdown
requests effectively destroys the VM session. For the sake of
clarity, the supportive system should then notify the caregiver
who was previously given access to the session (cfr., message
6 in Figure 4).
The crux of many cloud-based application architectures
lies in the management of access capabilities of third-party
applications. Gordon et al. take the developer API for building
services on the Facebook platform as an example [7]. Facebook
Fig. 4. Sharing a virtual machine session in MyPHRMachines.
Fig. 5. Deploying a new software service in MyPHRMachines.
can be seen as a conventional Web application that does
not implement separation between execution containers and
personalized mount points for data. Therefore, third party
applications can access and possibly log or abuse user data in
unpredictable ways, i.e. violating the privacy requirement R2
identified in Section III. Gordon et al. advocate that (1) APIs
need to be minimal for applications on such platforms, and (2)
the application platform’s user interface should give users an
effective view upon which of their data is used when by third
party applications. In MyPHRMachines we adopt a different
architectural solution to preserve requirement R2. Specifically,
we argue that the application platform, i.e. the PHR System,
should enable unrestricted analyses on user data as long as
input data and computational results are confined in a trusted
sandbox, i.e. the the VM running the third-party application
software where PHR data can be selectively mounted by the
patient.
Application developers of MyPHRMachines applications do
not need access to a central database containing patient data.
Instead, they contribute software that processes data that is
contained in a remote virtual machine. While developing the
application, developers will access VM sessions to which their
own test PHR data can be mounted. Only when patients access
the VM, their actual PHR data will be mounted. Since, by
default, VMs are internet-connectionless, this data cannot be
abused by the third-party service provider.
The UML sequence diagram shown in Fig. 5 models the
different interactions that occur in the development of a new
MyPHRMachines service. First, the service provider requests
a clone of a virtual machine image. The MyPHRMachines
platform answers this requests by delegating the request to
one of its VM image libraries. Initially, a cloned VM image is
made private, which means that only its service provider can
access it (cfr., message 4 in Figure 5). Message 8 in Figure 5
represents a new session request by the service provider for
its private VM image. Message 11 represents the uploading
of service binaries to the remote VM. MyPHRMachines does
not offer an advanced API for this purpose: the conceptual
model shown in Fig. 2 clarifies that the Store operation takes
a raw BLOB as an argument. After uploading service binaries
(and potentially also some test data), a service developer
tests his new service in the remote VM (cfr., message 13 in
Figure 5). Once all tests have passed, the developer termintates
his VM session (message 14) and “publishes” the image.
MyPHRMachines then sets the visibility of the image to public
(message 18). This makes the service available to a particular
target audience (e.g., citizens of a country, customers of an
ensurance company, etc.). Then, patients can access the service
using the scenario that was discussed in the context of Fig. 3.
As outlined before, MyPHRMachines blocks traffic from
VMs to the internet. Additionally, traffic needs to be mon-
itored both for real-time, automated verification purposes as
well as for a posteriori, manual inspections by patients and
platform administrators. Firewall policies should be set at the
MyPHRMachines platform level instead of inside individual
virtual machines since otherwise these can be overridden by
malicious expert VM users. The concrete firewall policies, e.g.,
restricting access to particular domains, disabling outgoing
traffic, etc., are outside the scope of this paper.
V. HEALTH INFORMATION SHARING FOR GENOMIC DATA
ANALYSIS
We have successfully evaluated the proposed architecture
and its privacy-related concerns on a complex use case. More
specifically, we have used the MyPHRMachines platform to re-
alize the use case of privacy-compliant personalized medicine
in the cloud. Subsection V-A describes the specifics of this
use case and subsection V-B discussed the implementation of
the use case as well as the open challenges for deploying the
related prototype in production.
A. Use Case Description
Ginsburg et al. describe their vision of personalized
medicine as follows: “tailored care is given for every indi-
vidual based on their specific, molecular disease will become
the standard of care. In the prototypical office visit of 2015,
the physician will examine a patient’s genetic profile (stored on
CD ROMs or equivalent), lifestyle, and results from objective
molecular screening and monitoring tests. Algorithms, derived
from previous research efforts, will be used to compute the like-
lihood that a patient develops a host of chronic diseases.” [6].
In this paper, we do not focus on the algorithms that are needed
to realized this vision. Instead, we show why MyPHRMachines
should be used instead of CD ROMs to realize the above vision
in a privacy compliant manner.
In order to benefit from personalized medicine, a patient
needs to get a digital representation of his/her genetic profile.
This involves a one-time analogue to digital conversion of his
or her DNA sequence, i.e. the DNA sequencing [11]. The cost
of this process is dropping at such a dramatic rate (cfr., [20])
that we can soon2 expect such a service to be freely available
to citizens of developed countries.
A more durable area of value innovation will consist of
software services that give personalized medical advice based
on a genetic string. Patients may access some of these services
themselves while a large share of other services will require
physician interpretation [12]. Biomedical research institutes
could provide the software services on a pay per use or flat fee
basis while specialized clinics could empower their caregivers
with licenses for such services. Insurers may also have special
coverage schemes for using such services, balancing the cost
of the services against their expected health returns.
Clearly, a patient’s genomic data is quite privacy sensi-
tive, as it may reveal information, e.g. on past clinical or
psychological conditions, that could have a negative influence
on one’s career, mortgage negotiations, social relations, etc.
Although MyPHRMachines cannot ensure that genome data
is used ethically by the organization performing the initial
DNA sequencing, it can be used to protect patient privacy in
the context of software services giving personalized medical
advice based on the DNA sequence.
As a validation of our theoretical arguments, we
have implemented the above use case in MyPHRMa-
chines. The interested reader is encouraged to explore
the use case by following the instructions available
at https://sites.google.com/site/myphrmachines/demo-phr. We
created inside MyPHRMachines an account for a dummy
patient. For this patient, we have uploaded a fully sequenced
DNA publicly available on the Internet. Moreover, we de-
ployed to MyPHRMachines a virtual machine image contain-
ing the Promethease software, a freely available personalized
medicine package performing analysis on sequenced DNA, e.g.
calculating probabilities of developing specific sorts of disease
in a lifetime.
B. Architecture Revisited
Figure 6 shows a model of the expected system behavior
for the genome analysis use case. The neg block models
that the genome data should not be stored by the service
provider that performs the analog to digital data acquisition
step. The model shows that the digital data is sent back to
the user (cfr., message 3), who stores it via MyPHRMachines
to the secure data repository (cfr., messages 4 and 5). Such
services providers could also store the data directly to such
a repository as soon as (inter-)national standards and services
2http://geniachip.com/ aims at the 100USD barrier within the decade.
Fig. 6. Accessing a genome analysis service in MyPHRmachines.
consolidate in this context. Steps 6 to 13 are not specific to
the genome use case: they simply represent the generic VM
start and share operations that we have discussed already in the
context of Figures 3 and 4 respectively. Note that in the current
prototype of MyPHRmachines, a patient’s complete PHR will
be mounted to each new VM session. For this use case, that
means that besides the sequenced DNA of our example patient,
all his other data (e.g., a personal log of blood test results) will
be mounted into the VM executing the Promethease software.
Although VM users can unmount this data before sharing
the session to a caregiver, we argue that a production system
should be more user friendly in this context. Future extensions
of our prototype will allow patients to select via a simple web
interface which type of PHR data to mount in a specific VM.
Going back to privacy-related requirements of Section III,
the architectural features implemented by MyPHRMachines
in the above use case clearly satisfy requirement R2. The
sequenced DNA, i.e. the PHR data, can be accessed by the
VM implementing the Promethease software only within a
virtual sandbox environment without Internet connection. This
prevents the third-party service developer to download the PHR
data and enables real-time or a posteriori checks of malicious
usage patterns within the sandbox.
The satisfaction of requirement R1 is also guaranteed by
the possibility to unmount (subsets of) the available PHR data
in the required VMs. The requirement can be supported better
by enabling patients to select before VM startup which PHR
data subset should be mounted in the first place. Since this
paper focuses on the system architecture, the improvement of
the user interface does not represent a fundamental issue but
it is the object of ongoing implementation work nonetheless
since we aim to use the prototype for dissemination purposes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
This paper investigates privacy-related concerns in the
management of PHR data. Our analysis shows that a novel
PHR system architecture is desirable since privacy-related
requirements can only be partially satisfied by commercial
PHR systems. We also demonstrate that the architecture can be
implemented. In particular, we discuss how a complex privacy-
sensitive use case (in the domain of personalized medicine) has
been realized using our prototypical system implementation.
Future work will concern the refinement of the so-called
MyPHRMachines prototype, which we use as a vehicle to
validate and disseminate our results. This ranges from very
simple features, such as the selective mount of PHR data, to
more complex functionality, such as the run-time or a posteriori
checks of third-party PHR data malicious usage patterns within
the VM. We are also investigating the possibility of applying
MyPHRMachines at a care institution requiring patient health
information from several providers.
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